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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, THE
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE, AND
MORRISON
Ronald D. Rotunda*

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Morrison 1 which invalidated parts of the Violence Against Women Act on
federalism grounds-is one of the most significant Commerce
Clause decisions in recent years for several reasons.
First, the majority opinion illuminates and clarifies the
Court's view of the scope of federal power under the Commerce
Clause. The Court articulates, with a little more precision than
before, the limits on what is "Commerce among the States."
Morrison accepts broad federal power when Congress regulates
activities (even noncommercial activities) that cross state lines or
use the channels of interstate commerce. Thus, it signaled approval of the portions of the Violence Against Women Act that
federalize "crimes committed against spouses or intimate partners during interstate travel, "2 and portions that regulate the
"channels of interstate commerce-i.e., the use of the interstate
transportation routes through which persons and goods move. "3
But when Congress uses the aggregation theory-adding up
or aggregating a series of individual acts that together "affect"
commerce among the states, if the activity regulated neither
crosses a state line nor uses a channel or instrumentality of interstate activity-then the activity must have a "commercial character."4 It must affect "commerce." Morrison, in short, tells us
* The Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
1. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
2. S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 43 (1993). The provision is codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2261(a)(1), and the Morrison Court approves of it at 529 U.S. at 613-14 n.5.
3. United States v. Lankford, 196 F.3d 563, 571-72 (5th Cir. 1999), quoted with approval in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 n.5.
4. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 n.4 (emphasis added).
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that Congress may not aggregate a series of noncommercial actions (such as carrying a gun near a school) in order to reach the
conclusion that those actions affect "commerce."
Second, Morrison undercuts the argument that the Court
should abdicate its role in federalism cases on the grounds that
states can protect themselves. 5 This argument is treated as irrelevant because the entire Morrison Court (both the majority;
and the dissene) recognized that the doctrine of enumerated
powers and the principles of federalism are designed, for the
most part, to protect individuals not the states. Even Justice
Breyer's dissent in Morrison acknowledged that the purpose of
federalism and the purpose of the doctrine of enumerated powers are to protect individual liberty:
No one denies the importance of the Constitution's federalist
principles. Its state/federal division of authority protects liberty- both by restricting the burdens that government can
impose from a distance and by facilitating citizen participation
in government that is closer to home. 8

Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, agreed. The "Framers
crafted the federal system of government so that the people's
rights would be secured by the division of power." 9
The Framers of our Constitution anticipated that a selfinterested "federal majority" would consistently seek to impose
more federal control over the people and the states. 10 Hence,
they created a federal structure designed to protect freedom by
dispersing and limiting federal power. They instituted federal-

5. The Court relied on institutional restraints to protect federalism interests in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruling
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1976). In that line of cases, how·
ever, all the Justices agreed that the matters were within the Commerce Clause. The
only issue was whether the interests in state sovereignty placed some limits on federal
power to regulate matters that were within interstate commerce.
6. 529 U.S. at 613-17, nn.5-7.
7. Id. at 655 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J. dissenting), discussed below. See
also Ginsburg, J., dissenting, in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 30 (1995).
8. 529 U.S. at 655 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Souter
and Ginsburg joined only Part 1-A of the Breyer dissent, and this quotation comes in an
introductory, unnumbered section, shortly before Part 1-A. Hence, Justices Souter and
Ginsburg may not have joined this introductory portion.
9. ld. at 617.
10. See William T. Mayton, "The Fate of Lesser Voices": Calhoun v. Wechsler on
Federalism, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1083 (1997) (quoting Calhoun); cf. John C. Yoo, The
Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311 (1997).
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ism chiefly to protect individuals, that is, the people, not the
"states qua states. " 11
The Framers sought to protect liberty by creating a central
government of enumerated powers. They divided power between the state and federal governments, and they further divided power within the federal government by splitting it among
the three branches of government, and they further divided the
legislative power (the power that the Framers most feared) by
splitting it between two Houses of Congress. 12
Morrison is significant for a third reason-the rationale of
Justice Souter's dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Breyer. That sharply worded dissent is the focus of this
analysis.
The four dissenters accused the Court of ignoring precedent-a charge that is hardly unusual for a dissent. However,
what is noteworthy in this case is that it is the dissent itself that
seeks to overturn a long line of precedent. For the first time in
two centuries, these four Justices would hold that the scope of
federal power under the Commerce Clause is a political question. While the majority considers the Commerce Clause to be a
major enumerated power subject to a few limitations, the dissent
treats the Commerce Clause as a general power, not subject to
any judicial review. This dissent, in effect, treats the other enumerated powers as surplusage.
This effort by four Justices to apply the political question
doctrine to federal Commerce Clause questions and treat them
as nonjusticiable is a major break with precedent. To understand the significance of this endeavor, we first must turn to the
parameters of the Violence Against Women Act, which Congress passed with the best of intentions and which the Court
(also with the best of intentions) invalidated as beyond federal
power.

11. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1976), overruled in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the Court
spoke in terms of federalism used to protect the states. E.g. "The Act, speaking directly
to the States qua States, requires that they shall pay all but an extremely limited minority
of their employees the minimum wage rates currently chosen by Congress." But in Morrison, the Court recognized that the real purpose of federalism is to protect the people by
dividing authority between the federal and state governments.
12. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 n.7.
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THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACf
In United States v. Morrison, the Court-by a vote of five to
four-invalidated section 13981 of title 42Y This provision created a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated
violence. The law was popularly called "The Violence Against
Women Act," although the sex-neutral text of the statute (which
only refers to "persons") never mentions the sex of the victim:
A person (including a person who acts under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State)
who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and
thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b)
of this section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action
for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratorr, relief, and such other relief as a court
may deem appropriate. 4

State laws, of course, already criminalize violence whether
or not the perpetrator is motivated by gender. The new federal
law did not preempt such state laws. Instead, it defined a "crime
of violence motivated by gender" as "a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at
least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender. " 15 This
law did not require a prior criminal conviction or even a prior
criminal complaint. The civil plaintiff could file his or her cause
of action in either state or federal court. 16
Congress made extensive factual findings to show that the
violence affects commerce, but the Court ruled that they were
irrelevant to the constitutional analysis under the Commerce
Clause. The Court concluded that sexual assaults-in the aggregate-do not "affect" commerce among the states because the
aggregation doctrine does not apply to the effects of noncommercial conduct.
In Morrison, the plaintiff sued two persons who allegedly
assaulted and repeatedly raped her. She could have sued in state
court for the common law tort of assault and battery, but she
chose to sue using section 13981. She selected a federal forum
(although the federal law also authorized her to sue in state
court, even though she was relying on a federal statute). 17
13. Id. at 598.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2000).
15. ld. § 13981(d)(1).
16. ld. § 13981(e)(3).
17. Id. § 13981(e)(3) provides that federal and state courts "shall have concurrent
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The major issue before the Court was whether this law was
within the Commerce Clause given the earlier decision in Lopez
v. United States. 18 In that case, a 12th grade student had carried a
concealed handgun in a San Antonio high school. This act of
carrying the gun already violated state law, but the Federal Government prosecuted him under federal law, the Gun-Free Zones
Act of 1990. The Court overturned the conviction and held that
this action was not in interstate commerce. The government had
to prove some connection with interstate commerce. It was not
sufficient for the government merely to prove that the student
carried the handgun. 19
The Morrison majority invalidated the Violence Against
Women Act, emphasizing that it was like the law in Lopez because it did not regulate an economic or commercial activitfO
and did not have any other nexus with interstate commerce. For
example, it did not regulate something that had crossed state
lines or was an instrumentality of interstate commerce.Z1 Earlier,
in Perez v. United States/2 the Court had upheld a loan-sharking
law. But, said the Court, that was different: loan-sharking is an
extortionate credit transaction, and loan-sharking is a commercial crime. Lending money is a "commercial" activity. Sexual
battery is an unusually offensive crime, but it is not a commercial
crime?3
Undoubtedly crime, any crime, imposes costs on society.
Crime affects national productivity, and, when one aggregates
the costs of individual crimes, from purse-snatching to assaults
(whether gender-motivated or not), one might conclude that
they all affect commerce. Another way of rephrasing that argument is to assert that, in modern times, when we measure distances by time rather than miles (Los Angeles is only a few
jurisdiction."
18. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
19. Ronald D. Rotunda, Cases Refine Definition of Federal Powers, 17 Nat'! L.J.
C9, C12 (July 31, 1995).
20. 529 U.S. at 612-13.
21. See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977) (holding that proof
was required that a firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce to satisfy the re·
quired nexus between possession and commerce).
22. 402 U.S. 146 (1971). The Court upheld Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, which forbade extortionate credit transactions. Only Justice Stewart dissented,
on the grounds that there was no proof of interstate movement, use of the facilities of
interstate commerce, or facts showing that the defendant's conduct affected interstate
commerce.
23. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613: "Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity."
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hours from Chicago; one can travel from New York to London
on the overnight airline shuttle), everything is "commerce among
the states" and we no longer have a government of limited or
enumerated powers.
Under that theory, the Commerce Clause reaches everything, including barroom brawls. The Court has never accepted
that argument in two centuries,24 and all nine Justices in Lopez
explicitly rejected it. The majority acknowledged that, "[i]n a
sense any conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an
ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we have not yet
said the commerce power may reach so far." 25 Similarly, Justice
Breyer's Lopez dissent, which Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg joined, agreed that there are limits to the Commerce
Clause. Although the dissent-at this point in the development
of the case law-disagreed with the Lopez majority as to where
to draw the line, all nine Justices agreed that there was a line
and, ultimately, the judiciary will draw it.
Justice Breyer's Lopez dissent clearly disagreed with the argument that the Court should abdicate any role. He acknowledged that there are limits to the reach of the Commerce Clause
and that the Court must decide where they are. Indeed, in one
intriguing paragraph, he suggested what some of these limits
might be. He stated that, given the important limits on the
Commerce Clause, Congress could not regulate "any and all aspects of education":
To hold this statute constitutional is not to "obliterate" the
"distinction between what is national and what is local," nor is
it to hold that the Commerce Clause permits the Federal
Government to "regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens," to
regulate "marriage, divorce, and child custody," or to regulate
any and all aspects of education. 26

His choice of examples was interesting, because there is a cabinet level U.S. Department of Education and federal statutes and
agency rules already regulate many aspects of education, from
test taking to school lunch programs. 27
24. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935),
where Cardozo, J., concurring, objects to the "view of causation that would obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce."
25. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580.
26. ld. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
27. E.g., June Kronholz, Bringing Accountability to Schools Could Be Tough, Wall
Street Journal A24 (Jan. 23, 2001).
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Though Justice Breyer did not explain what federal requirements on education, or economic productivity, or family
law would be invalid, the important point is that he (and the
other three Justices who joined his dissent) acknowledged that,
at some point, the Court would draw the line. These four Justices disagreed with the other five as to where to draw the line
but they all agreed that there is a line and the Court must draw
it. After all, if the commerce power encompassed everything,
then the considerable powers that are already enumerated in Article I, section 8 (such as the war power) are unnecessary, redundant, and superfluous, just like the preceding repetitive synonyms in this sentence.
The dissent in Morrison is quite different from, and in fact
repudiates, the dissent in Lopez. The four Justices who join this
dissent are the same as in Lopez, but this time Justice Souter is
the author. Souter does not explicitly repudiate the Breyer opinion in Lopez but he advances a competing, diametrically opposed theory. What makes the Morrison dissent so unusual is
that Justice Souter suggests that the Court should treat Commerce Clause questions as nonjusticiable, a political question.
In contrast to Justice Breyer, who had agreed that there are
limits to the commerce power and the only issue was whether
the federal law at issue was within that power, Justice Souter rejects that framework and proposes complete judicial abdication:
[The majority rejects] the Founders' considered judgment
that politics, not judicial review, should mediate between state
and national interests as the strength and legislative jurisdiction of the National Government inevitably increased through
the expected growth of the national economy. 28

Later, he reemphasizes this point: "[As to] supposed conflicts of
sovereign political interests implicated by the Commerce Clause:
the Constitution remits them to politics."29
And yet again the dissent underscores its unusual invocation
of the political question doctrine:
Neither Madison nor Wilson nor Marshall, nor the Jones &
Laughlin, Darby, Wickard, or Garcia Courts, suggested that
politics defines the commerce power. Nor do we, even
though we recognize that the conditions of the contemporary

28. 529 U.S. at 647 (footnote omitted) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.).
29. Id. at 649.
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world result in a vastly greater sphere of influence for politics
than the Framers would have envisioned. . . . If history's lessons are accepted as guides for Commerce Clause interpretation today, as we do accept them, then the subject matter of
the Act falls within the commerce power and the choice to
legislate nationally on that subject, or to except it from national legislation because the States have traditionally dealt
with it, should be a political choice and only a political
choice. 30

Note that the last half of this paragraph, after the ellipses, took
back what the first half appeared to have conceded.
The dissent purports to accept "history's lessons" as its
guide, but that history does not suggest that the limitations on
the Commerce Clause "should be a political choice and only a
political choice." The lesson of history is the opposite.
Consider, for example, Jones & Laughlin, 31 one of the cases
that Justice Souter cites. The Court did not purport to abdicate
its role in adjudicating Commerce Clause issues. Instead, the
Court explained why the federal law regulated commerce among
the states. The New Deal Court rejected its earlier cases declaring that "manufacturing" is not commerce. The manufacturing
of steel is commerce, the Court now said. Transportation of
steel across state lines is concededly commerce: "of what avail is
it to protect the facility of transportation, if interstate commerce
is throttled with respect to the commodities to be transported!" 32
If Chief Justice Hughes were holding that the entire issue
was a political question, he could have written a much shorter
opinion, used the phrase "political question," and wasted no
time on whether "industrial strife would have a most serious effect upon interstate commerce. "33 On the contrary, he warned
that the commerce power "must be considered in the light of our
dual system of government and may not be extended so as to
embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society,
would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government. "34

30.
31.
32.

33.
34.

Id. at 651-52 n.19 (emphasis added).
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Id. at 42.
Id. at 41.
Id at 37.
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Similarly, in United States v. Darby, 35 if the Court thought
the issue were a political question, one would think that it might
mention the phrase. Congress decides how far to exercise its
considerable commerce power, within that power's outer
bounds, but the Court decides if the statute lies outside those
bounds.
In Wickard v. Filburn, 36 which the majority in Lopez and
Morrison had cited with approval, one wonders why Justice
Jackson's opinion dwelt on why grain consumed on the farm affects the amount of grain transported across state lines. Consumption on the farm where the wheat is grown accounts for "an
amount greater than 20 per cent of average production."37
"Home-&rown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce. "3 The Wickard Court did not blindly defer to Congress
and did not abdicate its role on the decision as to whether something is within interstate commerce. Rather, it explained why
transportation of wheat in commerce was "substantially affected" by home-grown wheat-a relationship that the Court
concluded was neither attenuated nor implausible. Wickard deferred to .Congress' judgment only on the question whether it
should exercise this power as broadly as it did, not on the question whether the power was within the Constitution.
One significant opinion that Justice Souter's dissent did not
cite was that of Justice Hugo Black in Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States. 39 That case upheld a federal law that prohibited motels and hotels from discriminating on the basis of
race. These businesses often served transient guests moving in
interstate commerce. They bought food and other goods and
services that had crossed state lines. The evidence supported the
conclusion that hotels and motels advertised out-of-state and accepted many of their guests from out-of-state, but refused to
serve racial minorities, who therefore found it more difficult to
travel in interstate commerce. It was difficult for blacks to drive
across the country because many private motels and restaurants
refused to serve them. The "vacancy" sign turned into "no vacancy" when the black family sought a room.
Justice Black was never a part of the pre-1937 Court that
read the Commerce Clause narrowly. He had no crabbed view
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

312 u.s. 100 (1941).
317 u.s. 111 (1942).
Id. at 127.
ld. at 128.
379 U.S. 241, 268 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
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of federal power. Yet, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, his concurring
opinion emphasized an important caveat:
[T]he operations of both the motel and restaurant here fall
squarely within the measure Congress chose to adopt in the
Act and deemed adequate to show a constitutionally prohibitable adverse effect on commerce. The choice of policy is of
course within the exclusive power of Congress; but whether
particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently
to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court. 40

Though Justice Black's comments were labeled a concurring
opinion, there was no hint in the other opinions that any of the
Justices would reject his analris. Indeed, in the companion case
of Katzenbach v. McClung, 4 the majority explicitly states: "Of
course, the mere fact that Congress has said when particular activity shall be deemed to affect commerce does not preclude further examination by this Court. "42 Justice Souter's dissent is irreconcilable with McClung and Justice Black's concurring
opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel.
Perhaps Justice Souter is not arguing that all Commerce
Clause issues are political questions. Souter may be saying that
the reach of the Commerce Clause is determined solely by a significant national economic effect, and hence that the Court's efforts to carve-out an area of noncommercial activities and traditional areas of state concern are unwarranted. But such a
criticism of the majority opinion would be off the mark. First,
while the majority mentions that the activities that Congress
seeks to regulate (carrying a gun near a school, a sexual assault,
etc.) are areas that the states have traditionally regulated, the
Court is not trying to create a list of activities that are part of
"inherent" state sovereignty.43 Instead, the Court makes clear
that Congress may always regulate that which crosses state lines
or involves the channels of interstate commerce, even if states
primarily or traditionally regulate those actions. 44
40. Id. at 273.
41. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
42. Id. at 303.
43. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Usery in the Wake of Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission v. Mississippi, 1 Const. Comm. 901 (1984); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Doctrine of Conditional Preemption and Other Limitations on Tenth Amendment Restrictions,
132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 289 (1984).
44. Less than a week after Lopez, the Court unanimously decided United States v.
Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 (1995) (per curiam). The Government prosecuted Juan Robert-
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Second, Souter may be arguing that if something is within
the scope of the Commerce Clause as defined by national economic effect, then the Court's role is at an end. In Souter's view,
politics and not the Constitution, decides if Congress may regulate noncommercial activity that, in aggregate, affects the entire
nation, because there is no principled basis for the Court to decide if an activity is "noncommercial." But the distinction is an
easy one. There conceivably may be cases where it is difficult to
determine if an activity is "noncommercial," and such a case
could test this theory, but that has not yet happened in over two
centuries. As the Morrison majority pointed out, "thus far in
our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause
regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature. " 45 The dissent was unable to undermine that
conclusion. In "every case" where the Court has "sustained federal regulation under the aggregation principle in 317 U.S. 111
(1942), the regulated activity was of an apparent commercial
character. "46
Lopez, as well, spoke of the noneconomic nature of the
conduct at issue. The law invalidated does not "regulate[ ] a
commercial activity." 47 The statute "by its terms has nothing to
do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms." 48 Lopez, which did not
overrule any prior case, assured us that, "[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation reguson for various narcotics offenses and for violating a provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by investing proceeds of those unlawful
activities in the "acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operations of, any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2000). Robertson invested in a gold mine in Alaska.
He was convicted on both the narcotics count and the RICO count, but the Ninth Circuit
reversed the RICO count because the Government had failed to introduce sufficient evidence that the gold mine was "engaged in or affect[ed] interstate commerce." Robertson,
15 F.3d 862, 888 (1994).
With no dissent, the Supreme Court reversed. It was unnecessary to consider
whether the activities of the gold mine "affected" interstate commerce, because the "affects" test or the "aggregation doctrine" is only necessary to "define the extent of Congress' power over purely intrastate commercial activities that nonetheless have substantial interstate effects." Robertson, 514 U.S. at 671. In this case, there was proof that
money, workers, and goods crossed state lines. The activities were no longer purely intrastate. For example, Robertson purchased at least some mining equipment in California that was transported to Alaska. Robertson transported $30,000 of gold (about 15%
of the mine's total output) out of state. He also sought workers from out of state and
brought them to Alaska.
45. 529 U.S. at 613.
46. Id. at 611.
47. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
48. Id. at 561.
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lating that activity will be sustained." 49 The Lopez majority reaffirmed Wickard v. Filburn, 50 and noted that it "involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school
zone does not." 51 The law in question is not even "an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity." 52
Souter's test as a practical matter leaves no genuine limit to
the Commerce Clause. In the aggregate, every widespread activity has a national economic effect. His analysis, even limited to
the aggregation theory, still makes the commerce power an
unenumerated power. Recall that when people or things cross
state lines or involve the instrumentalities or channels of interstate commerce, no one on the Court has a problem with a broad
federal power. 53 Why bother with using the theory of crossing a
state line or using the instrumentalities or channels of interstate
commerce?
Hence, Justice Souter's dissent in Morrison, in rejecting Justice Black's view of the Commerce Clause, also rejects the
Breyer dissent in Lopez. Yet, the same four Justices who embrace the Souter dissent are the same four Justices who join the
Breyer dissent in Lopez. Only the main author is different.
None of these Justices (Breyer, Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens)
explain, or even acknowledge, the inconsistency. The Breyer
dissent in Lopez explicitly accepted the idea that the Federal
Government is one of enumerated powers and that there are
limits to the Commerce Clause, although it disagreed with the
majority as to where to draw the line. In contrast, Justice Souter
implicitly rejects the idea that the federal government is one of
enumerated powers. Rather than disagreeing with the majority
as to where the Court should draw the line, he explicitly objects
to any role for the judiciary.
His proposed abdication is the first time in two centuries
that any of the Justices-in this case four of them-argued that
there is no significant role for the judiciary in determining the
metes and bounds of the Commerce Clause.54 Even in the pe49. Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
50. 317 u.s. 111 (1942).
51. 514 U.S. at 560.
52. Id. at 561.
53. See Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 (1995).
54. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) held
that in general it is up to the political process to decide what are "integral state functions" and when states should be immunized from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. What the federal government regulated in that case, a city-owned mass
transit system, is clearly interstate commerce, and federal regulation did not single out
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riod from 1937 through Lopez, no Justice on the Court ever proposed that the Court abdicate a judicial role. The Justices upheld federal regulations, sometimes over dissents,55 but they
never argued that the issue was a political question, like the decision to declare war, or the decision as to whether Congress has
properly accepted a state's ratification of a constitutional
amendment. 56
Justice Souter would change all that, and reject both Justice
Black's admonition and the Breyer dissent in Lopez. Souter
urges judicial abdication, while simultaneously making the surprising claim that it is the majority that rejects precedent. 57 The
Souter dissent also embraces a general federal police power that
the courts (in his view) could not review, although the Framers
and the representatives of the States at the time feared such a
general police power. Because Breyer also joined the Souter
dissent, one must assume that he too rejects his earlier opinion.
Souter's position was a surprise to the Solicitor General,
who agreed that the commerce power has limits and that
whether a matter falls within them is a decision for the Court.
The Solicitor General, in another case that same term, argued
that if the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to regulate "all
activity that might have some indirect or remote downstream effect on interstate commerce," that would "improperly vest plenary power in the national government." 58 Later, he repeated
the states for any special burdens. No Justice-in the majority or the dissent-argued
that the question whether something is interstate commerce is not a judicial question. In
fact, all nine 1ustices agreed that the matter being regulated is interstate commerce, the
same conclusion that all nine came to in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), which Garcia overruled. See Thomas H. Odom, The Tenth Amendment After
Garcia· Process-Based Procedural Protections, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev.1657 (1987).
55. E.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding federal law governing extortionate credit transactions, a commercial crime, after reviewing congressional
record; Stewart, J., dissented, arguing that the matter was not within the Commerce
Clause).
56. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Running Out of Time: Can the E.R.A. Be Saved, 64
A.B.A.J. 1507 (1978).
57. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, 1., dissenting).
58. Brief of the United States at 12, Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (No.
99-5739). Jones was another commerce clause case that the Court decided that same
term, although this time the Court decided on statutory grounds, in order to avoid the
Commerce Clause problem.
In Jones, Justice Ginsburg, speaking for the Court, reversed and held that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, "an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property 'used in' commerce or commerce-affecting activity; arson of such a dwelling, therefore, is not subject to federal prosecution under §
844(i). Our construction of§ 844(i) is reinforced by the Court's opinion in United States
v. Lopez, and the interpretive rule that constitutionally doubtful constructions should be
avoided where possible." 529 U.S at 850-51 (internal citations omitted). See also Scar-
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this refrain: "If Congress were authorized to regulate all activity
that could theoretically have some distant downstream effect on
interstate commerce, its powers would be effectively unlimited."59 The Souter dissent rejects the Solicitor's position.
Morrison shows that the Court is serious about policing the
commerce power. Congress still has considerable legislative
power, but it will be more difficult for Congress to enact legislation that is "more appropriate to county commissions than to a
national government." 60 The law in Morrison created a federal
tort that almost duplicated the state tort; the primary difference
between the two was that the federal tort was more difficult for
the plaintiff to use because it required proof of gender-based
animus. 61
CONCLUSION
The Framers created federalism not simply or primarily to
protect the states but to protect the people. The Court's New
Federalism should not be confused with the old states' rights
federalism, because the New Federalism is about freedom, not
about Jim Crow laws.
It is incorrect to conclude that Morrison shows that the present Court is deferential to the states. On the contrary, taken in
context, it shows quite the opposite. During the same term that
the Court decided this important federalism case, it also invalidated a state law that intruded on the parental relationship by
mandating grandparents' visitation rights. 62 This same Court
threw out state laws that interfered with federal power over international affairs63 and motor vehicles. 64 The Court upheld federal privacy laws that regulated state motor vehicle departments

borough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), (holding that the Government must prove
that a firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce in order to satisfy the required
nexus between possession and commerce).
59. Brief of the United States at 41, Jones (No. 99-5739).
60. Former Acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger, quoted in Mary Deibel,
Court Cutting Federal Role, Chicago Sun-Times 35 (June 25, 1999).
61. The arson law in Jones also duplicated state laws. It did not authorize one extra
dollar to hire more FBI agents to investigate residential arsons. States already criminalize arson and there was no suggestion that they needed federal help. If the law were interpreted to apply to residential arson, that interpretation would be largely symbolic; it
would serve the purpose of convincing voters that the Federal Government was against
arson.
62 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
63. Crosby v. Nat'/ Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
64. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
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and placed upon them the same restrictions imposed on private
parties. 65 The Court, in short, has shown that, when it is protecting civil rights and liberties, it is willing to override state law to
meet that goal. The present Court is neither conservative nor
liberal on federalism issues. If we must find a label, the most accurate one is libertarian because the Court invalidates laws, both
state and federal, that interfere with our liberty.
This "New Commerce Clause" does not prevent the Federal
Government from enacting any commercial regulation with
which the states would be incapable of dealing and that would be
necessary for a central government to enact. Indeed, Morrison
and its predecessors do not overturn any prior case law. But the
significance of these cases should not be underemphasized because they reinvigorate first principles.
Narrow majorities have decided these new Commerce
Clause cases. Often when there is a string of five to four opinions, at least one Justice in the majority waivers in the steadfastness with which he or she adopts the legal principle. Not so in
these cases. In all of them, the five-person majority-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy-acts as one. These precedents herald a greater protection
for the structure of the federal system and for the liberty that
this structure protects.
Some people are concerned that this interpretation means
that Congress cannot use section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment to regulate private conduct and thereby "expand"
civil rights. The concept of "expanding" human rights, like
motherhood, apple pie, and the flag, sounds magnificent and
wonderful. But it is like a knife that cuts both ways. If Congress
could use such a ~ower to expand some rights, it may do so by
narrowing others. 6
Moreover, except for Morrison, these cases limit the commerce power, not the section five power. The fact that an activ-

65. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
66. It should not be difficult to draft creative legislation that recasts a simple dilution of one right as an expansion of another. A Congress bent on limiting desegregation,
for example, would not simply enact a law authorizing states to establish racially segregated schools. Instead, the law might provide-in an effort to "expand" freedom of
choice- that states should establish a variety of schools and allow people to transfer to
their preferred schools, even if the result of such transfers meant that some schools became discriminatorily white or black. City of Boerne and its progeny prevent that result.
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ity is not within the Commerce Clause does not mean that it is
outside of the section five power. 67
Federalism is important because it is one of the structural
designs that the Framers created to help preserve our liberty.
The Commerce Clause is also important not only because it
gives Congress great power, but also because it grants that
power within limits. Thus, the majority in Morrison embraced
the important principle that Justice Black earlier articulated in
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States68 -"whether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come
under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is
ultimately a judicial rather than a le~islative question, and can be
settled finally only by this Court. "6 In so doing, it soundly rejected Justice Souter's novel and unprecedented argument that
Commerce Clause limits are nonjusticiable.
Our federal structure is as old as our Constitution, but it is
not outdated because it creates a framework that disperses
power and increases liberty. If the people were angels we would
not need a government, and if the governors were angels we
would not need a Constitution. Alas, neither is true, so we need
both. 70

67. Morrison did not create new law, for the Court had already held that section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment only allows Congress to enforce section 1, and section 1
requires state action. Only two of the nine justices in Morrison argued that section of the
Fourteenth Amendment could justify this law. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Powers of
Congress Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment after City of Boerne v. Flores, 32
Ind. L. Rev. 163,170 (1998).
68. 379 U.S. 241,268 (Black, J., concurring).
69. ld. at 273.
70. James Madison said in The Federalist Papers: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men, the great difficult lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. Federalist 51 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 290 (Mentor, 1961).

